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ABSTRACT
A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted
to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original
motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life
ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the
decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we
ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only
a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the
application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines
its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Fusing Right and Left
On what basis, if any, is it justifiable that some earn less than others? How one answers

and asks this question, is the litmus test of whether one is a member of the political right or left.1
Within the divided liberal tradition the right has answered this question of justice with an
emphasis on individual freedom, while the left has stressed the importance of equality. A recent
movement within political philosophy has attempted a synthesis between these two conceptions
of justice, fusing the right’s regard for freedom and individual responsibility with the left’s
concern for equality and fairness.
The resulting synthesis called “luck egalitarianism” is concerned with mitigating the
extent to which one’s well-being is subject to luck. I refer to any view as belonging to the luck
egalitarian family of views if it “seeks to combine the traditionally radical idea of distributive
equality with the traditionally conservative concern for holding people responsible for their
actions.”2 The luck egalitarian position is chiefly motivated by the idea that one’s success in life
ought to reflect one’s own choices and that we ought to mitigate the effects of bad luck on
people’s lives.3 Ronald Dworkin summarized the ideal as follows: “We must allow the
distribution of resources at any particular moment to be ambition-sensitive… but on the other
hand, we must not allow the distribution of resources at any moment to be endowmentsensitive.”4 The idea is that a person’s success in life ought to flow from their choices and should
not entirely hinge on events outside of their control. I find this original motivation for luck
Alternatively, we can ask the same question but with a different default assumption: “On what basis, if any, is it
justifiable to take resources from those who have produced them?”
2
Knight 2009, 1. Also see Anderson 1999
3
Jeremy Moss summarizes this succinctly, saying “Dworkin and Cohen tell us not only about the role of the
chance/choice distinction but also about the goal of egalitarianism, which is to eliminate the effects of bad brute
luck.” Moss 2014, 86
4
Dworkin 1988, 311
1

2

egalitarianism to be intuitive and compelling. However, I worry that the general approach that
luck egalitarian theorists propose to satisfy this ideal actually undermines this original
motivation.
In particular, I set about to demonstrate that implementing the luck egalitarian standard of
justice indexes the economic well-being of a person to features entirely outside of their control. I
demonstrate this by holding constant a person’s immediate circumstances and their choices in
response to these circumstances, while altering features entirely external to their control. I focus
on two external features in particular: the responsibility of others and the size of the population. I
intend to show that according to luck egalitarianism, alterations in these external features
completely change the earnings of an individual, despite the individual facing the same
circumstances and making the same choices. That is, in a luck egalitarian system of justice, these
external features overpower the importance of individual choice in determining economic
outcomes. If this is true, then luck egalitarianism undermines one of the central motivations for
its adoption and so those originally accepting the position on these grounds now have good
reason to abandon it.
1.2

Outline and Methodology
I begin by motivating the luck egalitarian position and then sketching a generic luck

egalitarian standard of distributive justice. In sketching out this standard I also define key
concepts and terminology. After defining this standard, I give a series of cases in which we can
observe a set of individuals’ distribution under two conditions, a baseline condition and a luck
egalitarian condition. The baseline condition models a distribution where income follows from a
combination of an individual’s initial endowment and choice. The luck egalitarian condition is
meant to correct for income flowing from unlucky initial endowments while preserving income

3

flowing from choice. Altering external features will reveal that while income flowing from
unlucky initial endowments is indeed corrected, this correction has an overpowering effect such
that income flowing from choices is not preserved. The upshot is that luck egalitarianism has one
desirable consequence and two undesirable consequences. The desirable consequence is that
satisfying the luck egalitarian standard significantly curtails bad luck stemming from unequal
initial endowments. However, it achieves this at the expense of reducing the extent to which
distributions are “choice sensitive” and further it indexes the economic success of a given
individual’s life to features that are entirely external to their control.5
I spend sections III through VI motivating, defining, and demonstrating the luck
egalitarian approach to distributive justice. In sections VII and VIII, I offer two detailed
demonstrations of how implementing luck egalitarianism undermines its original motivation. In
sections IX through XIII I give five possible luck egalitarian objections and rebut each objection.
I conclude in sections XIV and XV by exploring the underlying tension inherent in luck
egalitarianism and offer some thoughts on how to resolve it.

5

See Dworkin 1988, 311
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2
2.1

TWO CRITIQUES OF THE LUCK EGALITARIAN STANDARD

Motivating the Luck Egalitarian Project
Imagine that a day before you are set to proctor an exam a student e-mails you a doctor’s

note that indicates she has come down with the flu and that she is too sick to attend class. You
decide that this is a legitimate excuse for missing class and allow her to retake the exam at a later
date. Two days after you proctor the exam, a separate student e-mails you asking to take the
exam at a later date and offering no reason for missing the exam. You decide that the student has
not been responsible and do not allow him to retake the exam. Given that both students are
asking for the same thing why are you justified in treating these students differently?
Presumably, your differential treatment is justified on the basis of their relative levels of
responsibility. A common moral assumption is that we should not hold people accountable for
things outside of their control, such as getting sick, while they are to be held accountable for
things within their control, such as notifying others when they are unable to meet their prior
commitments. It seems that differences in choice or responsibility can justify differential
treatment and by consequence, differential effect. The irresponsible student is likely to have a
worse grade than his more responsible counterpart as a result of not being allowed to retake the
test, but we do not view this consequence as being unjust.
Luck egalitarian accounts apply this same way of thinking to the topic of distributive
justice. According to luck egalitarians, differences in income between any two individuals are
justifiable if these differences are the consequence of their choices. By contrast, differences in
income between any two individuals are not justified if these differences are the result of luck,
that is, the result of events that they are not responsible for causing.

5

Luck egalitarianism draws its intuitive strength from combining two powerful ways of
looking at normative issues. On the one hand it draws from liberal individualism, the idea that
our lives should be a reflection of our own personal choices and decision making. On the other
hand, it recognizes that sometimes people do poorly not because of any choice they have made
but because they are the victims of bad luck. Thus, the approach incorporates an egalitarian
element, whereby we can be justified in redistributing from those with good fortune to those with
bad fortune in order to offset inequalities based on luck and not choice.
2.2

The Luck Egalitarian Standard
Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they

share the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that
differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals
make.6 While the distributive goal offered here may not precisely map onto each approach, every
luck egalitarian account should be sufficiently similar to make my critique relevant.7
Generic Luck Egalitarian Standard: Economic goods are to be allocated such
that all individuals equally share the burden of bad brute luck8, and that differences in
economic goods are to only depend on differences in voluntary choices between
individuals.9
This description contains three terms that require further clarification: economic goods,
bad brute luck, and voluntary choices. I discuss each of these terms in order.

I say “responsible choices” here because luck egalitarians disagree about what sorts of choices you should bear
responsibility for and in what ways. See Arneson’s distinction between desert theorists and choice theorists. Arneson
2004
7
I discuss how Dworkin might relevantly diverge in the section entitled objection #5.
8
Lippert-Rasmussen says “…when luck-egalitarians write about “neutralizing luck”, this is really short-hand for
something like “eliminating the differential effects on people's interests of factors which from their perspective are a
matter of luck.” Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, section 7
9
Carl Knight puts it this way “variations in the levels of advantage held by different persons are justified if, and
only if, those persons are responsible for those levels.” Knight, 2009, 1
6
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Luck egalitarians disagree about what economic goods justice should track. Each luck
egalitarian has their own special brand of economic good that they prioritize. For example, for
Arneson it is “welfare,” for Cohen it is “advantage,” and for Dworkin it is “resources.”10 Instead
of using one theorist’s preferred economic good over the other, I will use income. The specific
economic good used should have little bearing on the effectiveness of the critique; income in this
context is interchangeable with whatever economic good each theorist prefers. A luck egalitarian
may substitute for income whatever brand of economic good he finds most compelling.
Nevertheless, I use income for four reasons. First, in comparison to other kinds of economic
goods it is easy to determine what someone’s income is. Imagine sorting through all of the
factors that go into determining someone’s level of advantage; such a task is too complex for our
purposes. Second, the amount of income that a person receives can easily manipulated either by
adopting different private property rules, instituting different systems of taxation, or
redistributing through the use of wealth transfers. Third, using income allows us to keep a foot
firmly planted in reality since it is something that can be easily tracked, measured, and
transferred. Fourth, using income is intelligible; that is, everyone knows what we are talking
about.
The notion of luck plays a central role in luck egalitarian theories.11 Luck in this context
refers to instances where a person’s life is affected by events entirely outside of their control. For
instance, that someone was born with only one properly functioning hand is an instance of bad
brute luck, while someone inheriting a large sum of money is an instance of good brute luck.
Brute luck can be contrasted with events that are caused, at least in part, by choices; e.g. deciding

10
11

See Dworkin 1981, Cohen 1989, and Arneson 1988
See Mason 2006, 89, Dworkin 2000, 287, and Vallentyne 2002
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to finish high school instead of dropping out, or choosing to work instead of taking the summer
off. I will discuss the relationship between choice and brute luck later.
The generic luck egalitarian standard attempts to equalize luck, but this raises the question,
what counts as “luck”? I adopt G.A. Cohen’s account of luck which can be put in the following
terms: “Y is a matter of luck for X if, and only if, (i) X is not responsible for Y; and (ii) X is not
responsible for Y if, and only if, Y is not, in an appropriate way, the result of a choice made by
X.”12 I choose this account because it seems most in line with luck egalitarian predilections,
including those found in Dworkin and Arneson.13 Lurking behind this account and threatening to
interrupt any meaning it might otherwise have are the topics of moral luck, responsibility, and
free will. However, these topics fall outside the purview of what I care to consider here. For all
intents and purposes, I assume that are people morally responsible for how they act. This is in
accord with what luck egalitarians generally hold. Dworkin puts it this way, “We might think
ourselves persuaded, intellectually, of the philosophical thesis that people have no free will, and
that we are no more causally responsible for our fate when it is the consequence of our choices
than when it flows only from a handicap or from society’s distribution of wealth. But we cannot
lead a life out of that philosophical conviction. We cannot plan or judge our lives except by
distinguishing what we must take responsibility for, because we chose it, and what we cannot
take responsibility for because it was beyond our control.”14

12

See Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, originally from Cohen 2011
I think Dworkin’s notion of responsibility is plausible here: “We take responsibility for our choices in a variety of
ways. When these choices are freely made … we blame ourselves if we later decide that we should have chosen
differently. We evaluate and criticize the ambitions out of which our choices are made. We try to reform or
overcome those character traits that have led us to make choices we would prefer not to have made. Our
circumstances are a different matter: It makes no sense to take responsibility for these unless they are the upshot of
our choices.” Dworkin, 2000, 323
14
Dworkin 2000, 323
13
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Luck egalitarianism is a view that connects what a person is entitled to with what they
voluntary choose. The idea is that inequalities in economic goods can only be justified if
differences in voluntary choices alone account for these inequalities.15 Critics of luck
egalitarianism have misconstrued the luck egalitarian position as being committed to letting
people suffer for all of their poor choices. As Brown points out, “’luck egalitarians do not
actually claim that every instance of voluntary choice should incur full responsibility.”16 The
question then remains, what kind of voluntary choices can account for these inequalities? Some
luck egalitarians hold that distributions ought to reflect ambition-sensitivity, while others are
concerned with effort.17 Regardless of how voluntary choices that confer responsibility are
specified, the critique offered here should apply. I use the term economic responsibility to refer
to those voluntary choices that people are responsible for and that confer entitlement. This
includes hard work, effort, prudence, or whatever else a luck egalitarian theorist might believe
confers entitlement. I will assume that the only thing that is untouched by luck is economic
responsibility.
Now that the three notions operating in the generic luck egalitarian standard are clearly
defined, consider the following example to make clear how the standard operates. Imagine two
individuals, Adam and Hephaestus. Assume that they have the same job, come from similar
backgrounds, and make the same kinds of choices. By “make the same kinds of choices,” I mean
they have the same economic responsibility. Some might still be puzzled what I mean by this, so
imagine that they both put in roughly the same amount of effort at their job, they are relatively
thrifty spenders and do not squander their wealth, and they make prudent decisions such that they

Cohen says, “brute luck is an enemy of just equality, and, since effects of genuine choice contrast with brute luck,
genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities.” Cohen 1989, 931
16
Brown 2009, 40
17
See Dworkin and Roemer respectively. Dworkin 1981, 311, Roemer 1996, 308
15
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are careful not to cause undue harm or risk to themselves or others. So when I say that Adam and
Hephaestus have the same economic responsibility, I mean the character of their voluntary
choices are roughly the same. Thus, they are the same in nearly every feature except the
following: through no fault of his own, Hephaestus is born with a physical disability which limits
his ability to produce as much as Adam. Adam makes considerably more money than
Hephaestus because of this fact. But given that both Adam and Hephaestus have identical
economic responsibility and that Hephaestus is comparatively worse off due to brute luck, under
the luck egalitarian standard, they are both entitled to an approximately equal distribution of
economic goods.18 Therefore, in order to meet the luck egalitarian standard, there would need to
be a transfer payment from Adam to Hephaestus to compensate for this difference.

2.3

Setting the Baseline

Since luck egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice, it tells us what standard needs to
be met in order to satisfy it. However, no society begins with justice, you have to arrive there
from somewhere else. Earlier I stated the luck egalitarian should want to “preserve” income
flowing from choice while “correcting” for income flowing from luck. The luck egalitarian
standard seeks to do this against the backdrop of a baseline condition. That is to say, the luck
egalitarian should want to preserve income in the baseline condition flowing from choice while
correcting for income in the baseline condition flowing from luck.
For this baseline condition I use an idealized market economy and do so for several reasons.
First, a key influence on the movement, Ronald Dworkin, thinks an idealized market is

According to Lippert-Rasmussen, “Most [luck] egalitarians believe that justice requires the nullification of all
differential effects of brute luck, feeling that it cannot be just that some people are worse off than others simply
because they have been unfortunate, say, to have been born with bad genes.” Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, section 7
18
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congruent with luck egalitarianism. Indeed, Dworkin argues that once initial equality of
resources has been guaranteed, then a market system enables individuals to reap the rewards of
their own choices. Dworkin says, “If he earns enough by working hard or by working at work
that no one else wants to do, to satisfy all his expensive tastes, then his choice for his own life
costs the rest of the community no more than if his tastes were simpler and his industry less. So
we have no more reason to deny him hard work and high consumption than to deny him less
work and frugality.”19 The idea is that if a person chooses to work hard to produce something,
they should reap the rewards, and similarly if they choose leisure time instead, nobody should
begrudge them, but they also shouldn’t expect others to sacrifice for their sake when they could
have chosen willingly to do otherwise.
Another reason for using an idealized market as the baseline is that it is a realistic starting
place. By and large, market systems have prevailed over planned economies in terms of their
overall effectiveness at providing the goods and services that people want and need.
Furthermore, most countries today, even social democracies and communist countries, use a
basic market framework for determining the initial production and distribution of goods, which is
then subject to redistribution. This makes a market economy a good baseline condition, since it is
the condition upon which any luck egalitarian redistributions would be implemented in the
society that most people live in today.
Keeping with the spirit of the original motivation, I assume that in an idealized
market economy an individual worker receives in compensation roughly his contribution. The
idea is that the gains from production and trade reflect the ambition and industriousness of the
laborer. Thus, as an individual increases his productivity, he also increases his income, and if he

19

Dworkin 2000, 85
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decreases his productivity, he decreases his income. Of course, someone’s productivity might be
affected due to no fault of their own. In such a case, deviations from the baseline condition may
be required in order to satisfy the luck egalitarian standard. Indeed, the luck egalitarian standard
is meant to handle such problems in the baseline condition.
To begin the analysis, consider again the two figures already introduced, Adam
and Hephaestus. Recall that they are similar with respect to all of their features, except that
through no fault of his own, Hephaestus has a disability which hampers his productive capacities.
Adam on the other hand, was born healthy and has no such natural impairment. In accordance
with our baseline condition I assumed that individuals receive roughly in proportion to their
economic contribution. Since Adam is healthy and responsible he is able to earn 100 dollars per
hour. On the other hand, Hephaestus is responsible but suffering from a disability and so is able
to earn only 20 dollars per hour. I further assume that Adam and Hephaestus are members of the
same society but have otherwise never interacted. Now I turn to investigate what the luck
egalitarian standard demands of them.

2.4

What Luck Egalitarianism Demands
The distributions of Adam and Hephaestus according to our baseline condition can be

represented as follows:
Table A: Adam and Hephaestus under the Baseline Condition
Agents Similar in Economic
Income Distribution under the
Responsibility
Baseline Condition
Adam
100
Hephaestus
20

I should note that there is one sense in which the 80 dollar difference between what the two
receive is a matter of luck and one sense in which it is not. It is a matter of luck that Hephaestus
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happened to have born with a lame foot, for if he had not been, then ceteris paribus, he would
receive approximately as much as Adam. However, it would be false to say that Adam’s earning
100 dollars per hour is a matter of brute luck. No, it was the combination of the lucky event of
having been born healthy and his economic responsibility that resulted in Adam’s rate of
earnings. Similarly, it was the combination of the unlucky event of having been born disabled
and his own economic responsibility that resulted in Hephaestus earning 20 dollars per hour.
Recall the luck egalitarian standard: Economic goods are to be allocated such that all
individuals equally share the burden of bad brute luck, and that differences in economic goods
are to only depend on differences in voluntary choices. Adam and Hephaestus have the same
kind of job and exhibit economic responsibility in a similar degree and so in comparison to one
another they do not differ with respect to their voluntary choices. The only way in which they
differ in comparison is that Hephaestus earns less due to a natural disability, a side effect of pure
brute luck. Therefore, since the difference between Adam’s income and Hephaestus’s income is
attributable to bad luck, this difference is unjustified. Or as Carl Knight puts it, “variations in the
levels of advantage held by different persons are justified if, and only if, those persons are
responsible for those levels.”20 Since this inequality is not justified, satisfying the luck egalitarian
standard would require transfers from Adam to Hephaestus until they are both equally well off.
In this case, 40 dollars of income is to be redistributed from Adam to Hephaestus. I assume that
this redistribution is performed with perfect information, perfect effectiveness, without
transaction costs, and that transfer payments do not distort the total amount of wealth produced
in the society.21 Table B describes the resulting distribution:

20

Knight 2009, 1
I make these assumptions because while economic efficiency and incentive problems are important when
considering any redistributive effort, I want to focus on the justice-bearing reasons relevant to luck egalitarianism.
21

13

Table B: Adam and Hephaestus under the Baseline and the LE Standard
Agents Similar in
Income Distribution
Income
Economic Responsibility
Under the Baseline
Distribution Under the
Condition
Luck Egalitarian
Standard
Adam
100
60
Hephaestus
20
60

2.5

The Responsibility of Others

Having observed what conditions satisfy the luck egalitarian, I turn to demonstrate how such
a standard effects the lives of individuals subject to standards external to their control. I add
another character to our story to illustrate the problem. Consider someone just like Hephaestus
with the same background, and possessing the same disability, but who does not make the same
choices. Belphegor, despite having the choice to do so, did not apply for the same kind of job
that both Adam and Hephaestus possess. Instead, Belphegor chooses to spend most of his time
on enjoyable but leisurely activities. Every once in a while, Belphegor works some part time gig
so he can eke by, but otherwise he chooses not to spend his time working. Belphegor’s disability
does not reduce his effectiveness in these jobs. The following two counterfactual claims are true
of Belphegor: 1) if Belphegor did not have the disability, but made the same choices, then he
would earn the same as he does now, and 2) If Belphegor did not have the disability and he made
the same choices that Adam did, then he would earn as much as Adam. Assume that Adam
shares society not with Hephaestus but with Belphegor instead, what would the luck egalitarian
standard demand? Since differences in income between Adam and Belphegor are attributable to
choice and not to disability, then according the luck egalitarian standard of justice, it would be
unjust to redistribute from Adam to Belphegor. Table C describes the resulting distribution:

14

Table C: Comparing Adam and Belphegor
Agents Similar in
Income Distribution
Economic Responsibility
Under the Baseline
Condition
Adam
Belphegor

100
10

Income
Distribution Under the
Luck Egalitarian
Standard
100
10

The distributions under the baseline condition and the luck egalitarian standard are the
same since differences in distribution are attributable to choice and not luck. By comparing
Hephaestus’s and Belphegor’s conditions under the luck egalitarian standard, one can appreciate
how the luck egalitarian standard assists individuals disadvantaged due to brute luck. The move
from the baseline to the luck egalitarian standard improves Hephaestus’s income by 300 percent,
while the move from the baseline to the luck egalitarian standard does not improve Belphegor’s
income since his inequality with respect to Adam is based in choice and not luck.
But if one looks at how Adam is affected by moving from the baseline condition
to the luck egalitarian standard, the story looks a bit different. In Table B, the move from the
baseline condition to the luck egalitarian condition makes Adam 40 percent worse off, while in
Table C, the move from the baseline condition to the luck egalitarian condition does not change
Adam’s income at all. Recall that Adam from Table B and Table C are the same in every respect
except one lives in a society with Hephaestus while the other lives in a society with Belphegor,
and the only difference between Hephaestus and Belphegor is their choices. In other words,
Belphegor making different choices is the key difference between Adam’s being entitled to 100
dollars or 60 dollars. But it is really strange for Adam’s entitlement under luck egalitarianism to
change based on the level of responsibility of others. Table D compares their two distributions.
Table D: Comparing Adam’s
Agents Similar in Economic
responsibility

Income Distribution Under the
Luck Egalitarian Standard

15

Adam (Table B)
Adam (Table C)

60
100

Recall that Adam from Table B and Table C, not only have the same economic
responsibility they also face the same circumstances. There is literally no difference internal to
Adam that explains their different distributions under luck egalitarianism, the difference is purely
external, namely who they happen to share society with.
So why does this pose a problem for the luck egalitarian? Recall that luck
egalitarianism was supposed to preserve income flowing from choice while correcting for
income that was flowing from luck. In Adam’s case, under a luck egalitarian condition, his
income depends on an external factor, namely, how responsible others are. Luck egalitarianism
was supposed to reduce the extent to which external factors determined a person’s economic
success, and yet Adam’s income under luck egalitarianism is indexed to an external feature,
namely, the responsibility of others. If a moral system is meant to reduce the extent to which a
person’s income flows from luck, it is problematic if a person’s income can be significantly
reduced based on the choices that others make. It undermines the very goal that made luck
egalitarianism attractive in the first place.
One potential response is to argue that what I am asking for is impossible. How
could a system possibly reduce the effect of luck of some, like Hephaestus, without imposing a
cost on others, like Adam? Indeed, the whole point of luck egalitarianism, was for individuals to
share in the bad brute luck, not to eliminate the possibility of bad brute luck altogether, since this
would be impossible. So, yes Adam’s life is subject to an increase in luck, and so he is a worse
off than he otherwise would be as a result, but Hephaestus is much better off, and why should
there be any difference between their earnings, given that they make the same kinds of choices?

16

While this is a strong response, it is important to keep in mind the limits of such a
response. Luck egalitarianism has two components: it is meant to correct for influences on
income stemming from luck, and it is meant to preserve influences on income stemming from
choice. The prior response places priority on the former while putting the latter in terms of a
comparative. But the comparative analysis cuts both ways. It’s true that Adam and Hephaestus
make the same choices, but it’s also true that Adam from Table B and Adam from Table C make
the same choices, as they are in fact the same person, and only someone else in the society has
changed. Luck egalitarianism is meant to correct for luck, but if it is to preserve for choice, then
the relative income levels of the Adams from our two separate tables should at least be in the
same ball park. Put differently, for people making the same choices and facing roughly similar
circumstances there should be a significant degree of staying power in Adam’s income. That is,
two people that make similar choices, in similar circumstances, yielding similar production
should not have radically different earnings. A 40 percent decrease in income seems like a
radical fluctuation and as we will observe, luck egalitarianism places no theoretical limit to such
fluctuations.

2.6

The Size of the Population

Turning back to our original scenario, imagine that Adam lived in a society with five people
like Hephaestus, instead of one. In Table E, I have listed the resulting distributions under the
baseline condition and the luck egalitarian condition:

17

Table E: Adam’s Income in a Society with many Hephaestus’s
Agents Similar
Income Distribution
Income Distribution
in Economic
Under the Baseline Condition Under the Luck Egalitarian
Responsibility
Standard
Adam
100
33.3
Hephaestus 1
20
33.3
Hephaestus 2
20
33.3
Hephaestus 3
20
33.3
Hephaestus 4
20
33.3
Hephaestus 5
20
33.3
Recall that under the baseline condition, Adam and the Hephaestus’s directly reap the
rewards of their own economic productivity. In the new scenario, Adam loses almost 70 percent
of what he would possess under the baseline condition, each Hephaestus benefits by almost 60
percent of what he possesses under the baseline. Luck egalitarianism was meant to be both luckreducing and choice-preserving, and while it’s luck-reducing role in the incomes of the
Hephaestus’s can be observed, its choice-preserving role is not reflected in Adam’s income. A
system is choice-preserving the extent to which alterations in external factors do not affect the
income of a person facing the same conditions and making the same choices. Obviously, luck
egalitarianism cannot be perfectly luck-reducing and choice-preserving, and it would ideally
strike a balance between these two normative goals. However, under the luck egalitarian
standard, there is no staying power in Adam’s income, it fluctuates completely with respect to
the degree to which others are responsible, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the
number of people there are.
There is one sense in which the luck egalitarian standard is choice-preserving. Suppose
all of the Hephaestus’s were Belphegor’s instead. In such a situation, the Belphegor’s would not
be entitled to any transfer payments from Adam since differences in income are reflected by
differences in choice. In other words, if we imagine all of the Hephaestus’s were Belphegor’s
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instead, then their income under luck egalitarianism would be the same as the baseline condition
So, under the luck egalitarian standard, the choice preserving element is just for determining
whether or not you are eligible for transfer payments. It’s important to pause for a moment and
consider that this is not because Belphegor’s life is deemed any less worthy. It’s simply the idea
that in order to justify a redistribution from one person to another person, the differences in their
income need to be rooted in luck, not choice. If Belphegor chooses to live differently than Adam
and this is the reason why he earns less, then the disparity of incomes is not arbitrary. If,
however, he makes the same choices and Adam and earns less based on luck, then these
differences are arbitrary, or so the luck egalitarian reasoning goes. So, the luck egalitarian
standard is choice preserving in the sense that it preserves the income among a group of
individuals who have chosen to lead similar lives. That is, the luck egalitarian standard is choice
preserving in the interpersonal comparative sense, but not in the counterfactual sense.
To demonstrate, I consider Adam’s income across different societies, comparing his
respective income in one society to another. The only factor that varies among each of these
societies is the number of Hephaestus’s present. All other considerations in the society are the
same. For ease of discussion I will be referring to four Adams (and each of whom
lives in a different society. While each Adam is a different person, we can imagine each of them
as virtual clones of one another having the same background, facing the same situation, and
making the same choices. The only difference between them is the number of Hephaestus’s in
each respective society. Table F lists the income of each Adam across various societies and
compares each of them across the baseline condition and the luck egalitarian standard.
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Table F: Adam’s Income Across Societies
Adams from
# of
Adam’s
Different Societies
Hephaestus’s in
Income Under the
Society
Baseline Condition
Adam 
Adam 
Adam 
Adam 

0
1
5
20

100
100
100
100

Adam’s
Income Under the
Luck Egalitarian
Standard
100
60
33.3
23.8

This table illustrates that under the luck egalitarian standard across societies, individuals
who face the same situations and make the same choices have radically different distributions. In
particular, as the number of Hephaestus’s increase, Adam’s income approaches, though never
reaches, 20 dollars. In other words, under luck egalitarianism, as the proportion of Hephaestus’s
increase, Adam’s income moves closer to whatever their average under the baseline happens to
be. However, there is absolutely no difference between the Adam in each of these societies and
yet under the luck egalitarian standard, Adam  earns nearly 5 times what Adam earns. If there
is no difference between each Adam across the various societies, why should the distribution of
each radically fluctuate between them?
What the luck egalitarian standard fails to take into account is that there are different
kinds of brute luck. The population size, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the
responsibility of other people in a given society are all external to Adam. Recall that “Y is a
matter of luck for X if, and only if, (i) X is not responsible for Y; and (ii) X is not responsible for
Y if, and only if, Y is not, in an appropriate way, the result of a choice made by X.”22 None of
these three things (population size, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the responsibility
of other people) are a result of a choice made by Adam, and so Adam is not responsible for them.
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Yet his earnings under the luck egalitarian standard are indexed to these three factors. But Adam
can no more alter these things than Hephaestus can alter his disability. One of the main reasons
to adopt luck egalitarianism was out of a concern that a person’s economic life not hinge entirely
on external factors. But under the luck egalitarian standard, Adam’s economic life does in fact
hinge on these external factors. Paradoxically, implementing the luck egalitarian standard
threatens the very notion that it was meant to safeguard, namely, that the economic success of an
individual’s life is to flow from his own choices and not be subject to factors outside of his own
control. Thus the implementation of the luck egalitarian standard undermines the original
motivation for adopting luck egalitarianism in the first place.
The problem emerges because there is not a non-comparative manner in which luck
egalitarianism is choice-preserving; egalitarianism is necessarily comparative. It is worth noting
that the critique put forward here is not an attack from within egalitarianism, but from the
outside. The whole point of egalitarianism is to divide the pie equally across some
equalisandum.23 Luck egalitarianism says that for any group of people with similar economic
responsibility, individuals in that group ought to share in the burdens of bad luck. So, it is a
simple consequence of egalitarianism that as you add more people without increasing the total
social product (by much), then the total social product will have to be further divided such that
each person’s share becomes smaller. So this cannot be a critique of luck egalitarianism as a
form of egalitarianism, because egalitarianism involves equalizing members of a particular group
across a given good, and the luck egalitarian standard achieves that among members of a
particular society.
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“An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalized.” Cohen 1989, 908
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The critique shows that egalitarianism makes our lives dependent on factors beyond our
control, in this case, the conditions of others. Egalitarians, generally speaking might not see
anything particularly problematic with Adam’s economic success being tied to how many
Hephaestus’s exist since this just is a necessary consequence of egalitarianism. Indeed, it is easy
to imagine someone asserting that we have not raised a critique for egalitarianism, we have just
demonstrated its implications. Yet such a response fails to properly address the point.
Egalitarians in general might be willing to bite this bullet, but luck egalitarians in particular,
sincerely motivated by the idea that we should insulate an individual’s life from brute luck,
cannot so easily shrug off the charge. This is because the luck egalitarian standard is being
critiqued on the very ground that motivates it, i.e. it makes Adam’s life completely subject to
luck. The problem is that egalitarianism, as a process of distribution, is responsible for the brute
luck affecting Adam’s life. Luck egalitarians either need to show why treating Adam in this way
does not undermine the original motivation or deny that luck egalitarianism entails that we
should treat Adam this way.
Luck egalitarians wishing to defend their view have five routes available. First, they can
argue that Adam’s economic success is not ruled by luck under the luck egalitarian standard
because he has no presocial entitlements, that is, he has no claim that his entitlement
approximate the baseline condition. Second, they can deny that the idealized market condition is
a legitimate baseline and argue that some other baseline is required. Third, they could challenge
the assumption that Adam has a unique entitlement to his income and hold that Hephaestus has
some claim to that income since the product of their labor is inextricably joint. Fourth, they could
contend that the kind of brute luck Adam becomes subject to under the luck egalitarian standard
is warranted from the standpoint of justice, while the kind of brute luck that Hephaestus is
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subject to without the standard in place is unjust and therefore worthy of rectification. Fifth, they
could object to the interpretation of the luck egalitarian standard offered here and could argue
that the standard does not entail aggregating the sum of labor and dividing it equally among
those with identical economic responsibility, therefore avoiding the objection that the luck
egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life dominated by brute luck. I will explain and then respond
to each of the five objections in turn.
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3
3.1

HANDLING OBJECTIONS

Objection #1: The Baseline Does Not Matter
The first line of defense for the luck egalitarian might be made along Rawlsian lines. Just

distributions are arrived at under a fair scheme of cooperation.24 If the luck egalitarian scheme is
fair, then whatever distributive outcomes that arise from it are also fair. The objection may also
be put this way: Adam does not have any entitlement prior to the just social arrangements being
put in place. That is, merely because the 100 dollars under the baseline condition are a product of
his choice, that fact alone does not entitle Adam to those 100 dollars. Instead, Adam only derives
a legitimate entitlement from whatever he would get according to a fair social schema. For luck
egalitarians, the fair social schema is the luck egalitarian standard, so Adam is only entitled to
outcomes derived from a correct implementation of that standard. Since Adam does not have any
presocial entitlements, he is not being unjustly deprived of anything. Under this line of
reasoning, none of the Adam’s, and , have any entitlements independent of the luck
egalitarian scheme. Therefore, none of them have legitimate grounds of complaining about their
respective distribution.
There are two problems with the objection and I will begin with the less significant
problem. If Robinson Crusoe built a canoe from the resources that he had on his desert island,
independent of anyone else’s assistance, and someone came along and took the canoe, they seem
to have wronged Robinson Crusoe.25 If there are no presocial entitlements whatsoever, why
would it be wrong to take the canoe without Robinson Crusoe’s consent? It cannot be on the

Rawls says, “I stress that there is no criterion of a legitimate expectation, or of an entitlement, apart from the
public rules that specify the scheme of cooperation. Legitimate expectations and entitlements are always based on
these rules.” Rawls 2001, 72
25
Nozick raised this issue in response to Rawls saying, “wouldn’t it be unjust if someone stole another’s products in
the noncooperative situation?” Nozick 1974, 186
24
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basis that Robinson Crusoe would otherwise use the canoe, since it would not be wrong to take
some of the coconuts on the island despite the fact that Robinson Crusoe might use them.26 The
obvious difference is that Robinson Crusoe built the canoe, but he did not build the coconuts.
Robinson Crusoe had to exert his time, effort, and energy into producing something, and so his
entitlement is a product of his choices in response to his circumstances. To deprive Crusoe of the
canoe is to deprive him of living the life that he chooses.
Some might object to this reasoning on grounds that luck egalitarians typically reject
Lockean entitlement claims derived from the product of one’s labor.27 But Lockean entitlement
theory is not necessary to reach the conclusion that Crusoe has a unique entitlement claim to the
canoe that others do not have. Suppose, for example, in Village A that Crusoe’s canoe is
regarded as common property, such that anyone in the village is capable of using it at any time
and for any reason, and that Crusoe’s claim to the canoe does not trump anyone else’s claim at
any given time. Now imagine in Village B that Crusoe’s canoe is regarded as his own property
except in emergency circumstances such as when another villager is drowning. Now consider the
following question, does Crusoe have more control over the way his life goes in Village A or in
Village B? Canoes, of course, are advantageous for fishing, catching crabs, or just enjoying the
water, so in Village A, there will likely be constant use of Crusoe’s canoe, while in Village B,
Crusoe’s will have access to the canoe whenever he needs it. So when answering the question, is
there any doubt that he has greater control over the economic success of his life in Village B than
in Village A?
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With the obvious stricture that we should not take all the coconuts thus depriving Crusoe the ability to feed
himself. See Locke 2005, 16
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Dworkin 1988,312
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The luck egalitarian might respond, sure, Crusoe has more control of his life, but this
comes at the expense of others. But this actually does not follow. Crusoe’s production of a canoe
does not prevent others from creating their own canoes. Indeed, there are likely to be more
canoes in Village B than in Village A since people have more of an incentive to produce canoes
in Village B than in Village A.28 But even apart from this economic fact, Village B is more in
keeping with each person choosing the life he wishes to lead. In Village B, someone who prefers
to eat coconuts, and spend the rest of their time lounging on the beach, is free to do so.
Presumably, their preference for doing this bundle of activities is greater than another bundle of
activities, such as giving up beach time to craft a canoe. By contrast, when this same person in
Village A has the entitlement claim to use Crusoe’s canoe whenever it becomes available, it
comes at Crusoe’s expense. Crusoe, on the other hand, cannot make use of this person’s beachtime. In Village B, there is a symmetry of relationship between the two persons such that each
can gain the benefits of how to spend their time, while in Village A, there is an asymmetry such
that Crusoe’s use of his time benefits others, while the use of others’ time does not benefit
Crusoe. At the end of the day, Village A is not choice-preserving with respect to labor time,
while Village B is choice-preserving with respect to labor time.
If eroding Crusoe’s entitlement claim to the product of his creation diminishes his control
over the economic success of his life, then the same holds true of Adam. There are circumstances
in which the tribe is justified in using Crusoe’s canoe without his consent, like in the specified
case of drowning villagers. The same applies in Adam’s case, such that society can be justified in
reducing Adam’s income to assist Hephaestus. However, if there are no limits placed on the
extent to which Hephaestus can claim a share of Adam’s earnings, then Adam living under a
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luck egalitarian standard is like Crusoe living in Village A. The result is that the luck egalitarian
standard completely erodes the baseline and undermines the ability for Adam to control his own
economic life. Adam uses his time in response to his circumstances to produce 100 dollars per
hour for himself. Recall that Adam did not inherit this money; it is a product of his choices in
response to his circumstances. In order to be choice-preserving, luck egalitarianism must
preserve some reasonable amount of income such that the effectiveness of his choice is not
diminished. If, for example, Adam’s income fluctuated between 70 dollars and 130 dollars under
the luck egalitarian standard in response to alterations in the responsibility of others and the
population size, then an argument can be made that luck egalitarianism satisfies choicepreservation. But I have shown that changes in these two external features cause radical
perturbations in Adam’s income despite him making the same choices in response to the same
circumstances.
Some luck egalitarians might not be convinced that Crusoe has any entitlement to the
canoe, and thus be unmotivated by appeal to the case presented here. These luck egalitarians
might deny that the choice-preserving element ought to be derived from some relevant baseline,
or even that it should play a role at all. For instance, one can imagine some luck egalitarian
theorist asserting that all that matters is the comparison between two individuals. They might say
Robinson Crusoe, Adam, Hephaestus, or anyone else can only have an entitlement claim in
virtue of the comparative procedure determined by the luck egalitarian standard and on no other
basis. Can these luck egalitarians escape the problem at hand?
One need not assume that Adam has any presocial entitlements in order to see how the
luck egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life subject to unremitting luck. Even if entitlements are
only legitimately derived on a purely comparative basis, Adam’s income still entirely depends on
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external features. To see this, look at each of the tables, ignore the baseline and instead only look
at distributions under luck egalitarian standard. It still remains true that the economic success of
his life is dependent on how many other people there are, how responsible they are, and how bad
off they are. While the critique becomes stronger if one holds the commitment that Adam has
some entitlement to the income generated by his choices, it does not depend on it. It’s still true
that Adam in one society will fare significantly better than Adam in another based on entirely
external features that he is not responsible for. Therefore, even if one takes the radical
assumption that there are no presocial entitlements and that entitlements are only ever
determined through the comparative procedure, the problem of indexing Adam’s life to luck
based features remains.
3.2

Objection #2: Idealized Markets Are the Wrong Baseline
While Dworkin thinks that the market can serve as a legitimate baseline, other luck

egalitarians, such as Cohen, might find this objectionable and instead argue that some other
baseline is legitimate. They might further argue that choosing the appropriate baseline can solve
the problem since under the correct baseline, we can parse out income accrued due to choice
versus income accrued due to luck.
The original situation can be altered to show that the problem remains under any baseline
condition. Imagine that the 100 dollars Adam receives is derived from whatever the respective
luck egalitarian might consider to be a legitimate baseline, whether it is the resources Adam
directly gathered from nature, the full value of Adam’s labor that can be ascertained in an
idealized socialist scheme, the transactions that Adam makes in a system of fairly agreed upon
social rules, trades that Adam participates in within a free market, or whichever other process
that confers legitimate holdings that the luck egalitarian would accept.
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Once the original baseline has been established, apply the same process of reasoning as
before. Imagine, for instance, society adopts one of G.A. Cohen’s suggestions, that every hour of
work gets paid the same. The idea is that since work is paid the same, each person gets to choose
the relevant work to leisure trade-off that is best for them, and so “under a system where each
gets the same income per hour, but can choose how many hours she works, it is not an
intelligible complaint that some people have more take home pay then others.”29 However,
suppose that Hephaestus’s disability could limit the number of hours it is possible for him to
work, while Adam has the ability to work as much as he chooses. Now imagine that as a result,
the distribution is the same as in our original situation (Table B), such that Adam receives 100
and Hephaestus receives 20 dollars. So, even in Cohen’s chosen case, deviations from the
baseline will occur, such that Hephaestus is still disadvantaged compared to Adam. This is
because regardless of what system is used to confer original entitlement, it is always possible,
indeed likely, that it will stray from satisfying the comparative measure.30 Cohen would agree
with this point, and I raised it only to demonstrate that choosing a different baseline will not fix
the structural problem that I’ve identified, and so this objection dissipates.

3.3

Objection #3: Adam Cannot Do It Alone
A third line of response by the luck egalitarian involves challenging the original

assumption in the provided scenario. Someone might argue that in an advanced society, social
products are inextricably joint, and thus no individual can claim to have an exclusive entitlement
over some portion of the given social product.31 Adam’s production is dependent upon either the
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conclusions, Cohen argues that because the world is jointly owned initially, one cannot appropriate natural resources
30

29

production of others or the consent of others. Since Adam lives, trades, and operates in the same
society with Hephaestus, Hephaestus’s production is a necessary part of Adam’s ability to
produce a lot. So, Adam has no permanent entitlement claim over the 100 dollars alone, but owes
Hephaestus some of these units since Hephaestus is a necessary part of the production process.
I first note that challenging the assumption of the thought experiment can only be taken
so far. Then I show that even if we take this line of reasoning as far as it goes, it leads to
undesirable consequences for the luck egalitarian. The idea that social products are inextricably
joint is true in the sense that many people might contribute to the process of production, but this
does not undermine the idea that some individuals are more responsible for producing a given
product or service than others. That is, we can still identify that the primary causal force in any
given person’s production is that person. Consider Calliope the musician who uses expensive
electronic equipment to produce her songs. If Calliope decided to cease working altogether, she
would stop producing songs. In other words, her immediate choice to stop, would be sufficient to
cease her musical production. This is not true of her production in conjunction with others. If the
company which sold her the electronic equipment ran out of business, she could go to a different
company. If all such advanced electronics companies ran out of business, she would have to start
producing her songs on vinyl. If all uses of electricity were impossible because of some strange
global catastrophe, Calliope could play in front of live audiences. We can continue along this
line of reasoning until either Calliope gives up and chooses a different profession or she
furnishes a guitar out the resources found in her backyard. Calliope’s production is improved by
her interaction with others, but she decides whether she produces, what she produces, and the
extent of that production. The point here is that Calliope’s agency is the operative causal force

via labor alone. See Rawls 1993, 275 and Cohen 1995. Similarly, some have also argued that ownership is a social
fact that requires the rational consent of those affected by it. See Lindsay 2015
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behind her production. The luck egalitarian who argues that we do not have legitimate holdings
because all social products are inextricably joint holds a position which is in tension with the
following plausible claim: that being the operative causal force behind your own production
greatly contributes to your claim of entitlement to the product of that production. Denying the
moral importance of this fact might be easy for an egalitarian welfarist or a utilitarian, but it is
not easy for the luck egalitarian. If the luck egalitarian wants to take seriously the notion that our
income should be a reflection of our choices, then it is difficult to see how the luck egalitarian
can deny a person’s entitlement to the product of those very choices.
There is a second problem with this line of reasoning. Predicating Hephaestus’s
entitlement on the notion that he contributes to Adam’s product puts Hephaestus’s entitlement to
assistance in a precarious position. What if Hephaestus was not in fact at all necessary to produce
the 100 dollars? What if Adam’s production of 100 dollars was inextricably joint with a
collection of other individuals that did not include Hephaestus at all? In other words, imagine
that Hephaestus’s own contribution was completely causally unrelated to Adam; perhaps he
made paintings that Adam did not enjoy and would never purchase. By removing Hephaestus
from society, Adam loses nothing. If Hephaestus played no role in bringing about the 100 dollars
Adam produced, would the luck egalitarian concede and say that Adam owes Hephaestus
absolutely nothing? If Hephaestus’s production is not necessary to bring about the 100 dollars,
then are Adam’s duties to Hephaestus now dissolved? Surely, the luck egalitarian would not
want to say that Hephaestus should be left without assistance because he was not a part of the
processes by which Adam produced 100 dollars. Biting the bullet by saying that Hephaestus is
entitled to no assistance whatsoever would be just as damaging to the luck egalitarian position as
biting the bullet that the luck egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life subject to unremitting luck.
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So if the luck egalitarian wants to maintain that Hephaestus is entitled to assistance even if he is
not a part of the production, then what is the relevance of the social product being inextricably
joint? Either the social products being inextricably joint is a fact relevant to the entitlement
claims or it is not. If it is not relevant, then this objection dissolves. If it is relevant, then the luck
egalitarian is predicating Hephaestus’s entitlement claim on whether or not he is a part of
productive process. Then in the cases where Hephaestus (or those like him) are not a part of the
joint productive process, they are then left out in the dust, with no entitlement claims.

3.4

Objection #4: Only Interpersonal Luck Matters
A fourth response involves distinguishing between different kinds of brute luck. Susan

Hurley, a prominent critic of luck egalitarianism, distinguished between two kinds of luck that
might be helpful for the luck egalitarian here. Hurley differentiates between interpersonal luck
and counterfactual luck. Under the interpersonal account, “I compare my situation with other
people’s situations. I have bad luck when what I and others have is a matter of luck, and I am
worse off than others.”32 Interpersonal luck only comes into play when there are comparative
differences between individuals that are based on luck. Alternatively, under the counterfactual
account, “I compare my actual situation with other possible situations I might have been in. I
have bad luck when what I have is a matter of luck and I am worse off than I might have been.”33
Here the point of comparison is not between separate individuals, but between the situations that
you might have otherwise been in. Distinguishing between these two kinds of luck enables us to
see the different ways that Adam’s and Hephaestus’s life become subject to luck.
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In the original situation featured in Table A, the difference between Adam and
Hephaestus’s distribution is one of interpersonal luck. Adam and Hephaestus have equivalent
degrees of economic responsibility, but Hephaestus has 80 fewer units of income due to morally
arbitrary factors, and hence has bad interpersonal luck. This is in contrast with the kind of
analysis I ran when comparing Adam’s situation in Table A with his situation in Table C. In that
case, we compared Adam’s state under the luck egalitarian standard with Adam’s potential state
without that standard and noted that the differences in his income were not based on his
economic responsibility, meaning that in Table C, he suffered from bad counterfactual luck. The
defender of luck egalitarianism might contend that we should only concerned with interpersonal
brute luck and not counterfactual luck. This would allow her to evade the critique posed here
since the critique supposedly rests upon the notion of counterfactual luck.
This response suffers two drawbacks. First, the luck egalitarian needs to say why
we are concerned with interpersonal luck and not counterfactual luck in a way that is nonquestion begging. The luck egalitarian needs independent grounds for compensating one kind of
luck without being concerned with the other. Yet it seems unlikely that there is a way of doing
this that is not in tension with the original motivation for adopting luck egalitarianism in the first
place. The concern about luck was motivated by the idea that our lives should be up to us. The
point was that we should be in control of our own lives and that external events impinge on the
possibility of individual control.34 So if part of the concern was ensuring that individuals control
their lives, then all forms of luck pose a potential threat to that control. Why exclude some forms
of luck from our considerations of control?

Explaining the luck egalitarian view here, Cohen says, “the grounding idea of Dworkin’s egalitarianism is that no
one should suffer because of bad brute luck,” and then he goes onto say “I believe that we should compensate for
disadvantage beyond a person’s control...” Cohen 1989, 922
34
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The second problem with this response is that my critique can be described both
in terms of interpersonal and counterfactual luck. In fact, Table D is just a list of comparisons
between different individuals, all named Adam, in different societies. I compared two different
people, Adam  and Adam who earn radically different amounts, except the only difference
between them is that they live in different societies. Adam has bad interpersonal luck since he
is far worse off than Adam and this difference is not derived from differences in choice. So
even if the luck egalitarian could give a reason for compensating interpersonal luck over
counterfactual luck they still remain saddled with the problem presented here.
Some luck egalitarians may want to make the claim that we should not be
concerned with luck between individuals living in separate societies, but only among individuals
living within societies. They may argue that since the critique rests on a comparison between
Adam across different societies, that it only applies to global luck egalitarianism and not intrasocietal luck egalitarianism.35 However, this ignores the changes in population size and relative
levels of responsibility that happen within societies themselves. I could have just as easily made
the comparison between the same Adam in the same society across different time slices. For
instance, if over the course of decades the Belphegor’s change their habits to become more like
Hephaestus’s, then Adam’s level of entitlement would radically transform despite Adam’s
choices and level of production remaining the same. Thus a kind of intra-societal luck
egalitarianism does not evade the challenge I have posed here.
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3.5

Objection #5: Separate Choice-Derived Income from Luck-Derived Income
The previous four objections are all premised on defending the luck egalitarian standard

and the resulting distributions. However, some luck egalitarians might want to argue that the
prior discussion was ill construed and assert that luck egalitarianism is not committed to the
distributions detailed in the examples. Some luck egalitarians might think that we are making the
distributive cut across the wrong lines. As Dworkin puts it, we shouldn’t seek to “squeeze the
differences out of persons or lives.”36 So a luck egalitarian might ask, ‘Which portion of Adam’s
product of labor comes from brute luck and which portion comes from economic responsibility?’
They may argue that the portion of Adam’s labor which is the result of brute luck is open to
redistribution, but not the portion which is the result from economic responsibility, i.e. his
choices.37 By separating the income derived from luck from the income derived from choice, we
could find a natural limit to the amount that could be taken from Adam, therefore diffusing the
critique offered here. For example, if it turned out that 80 units of Adam’s income came from his
economic responsibility and 20 units from luck, then we could not take any more than 20 units
from Adam to assist Hephaestus. If on the other hand, 50 units came from luck, and only 50 from
economic responsibility, then we could only take up to 50 units from Adam, depending on the
needs of Hephaestus. This solution, if applicable, would neatly solve the problem I have
presented here.
Before the luck egalitarian can rejoice in this solution, we need to know what it means to
separate the income solely derived from luck and the income solely derived from economic
responsibility. We can make some sense of the idea of income solely derived from luck. Imagine
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that when you were born, you were entered into a lottery for one million dollars, and you won
the lottery on a random drawing. There was no choice that you made to either enter the lottery or
to improve your chances of winning, so we can describe your winning as an instance of brute
luck. Similarly, if you inherit a large sum of money from your parents, we can say that these
earnings are, from your perspective, luck based. You did not do much to receive the money that
you inherited, except in so far as you made choices to remain in the good favor of your parents.
The income earned from inheritance in this circumstance and from the perspective of the agent
receiving the money is derived from luck. It is on this basis that the luck egalitarian should find it
more desirable from the standpoint of justice to tax inheritance than to tax wages or salaries,
since the latter are derived from deliberate choices of the agent earning the income and not from
some source external to that agent. Yet while wages and salaries are derived from deliberate
choices of the earning agent, they are not solely the consequence of his or her choices.
Returning to the issue at hand, can the amount of income derived solely from economic
responsibility be determined? While it’s possible to distinguish between luck and choice, the
question is whether or not there is some portion of the income derived from choice that is free
from the influence of luck. The problem here is that luck frames the very circumstances in which
we make our choices to begin with.38 For example, suppose Adam decided to be a carpenter and
he worked hard at his craft. He practiced for thousands of hours and persisted in his efforts even
when there were moments where he wanted to give up. He sacrificed other opportunities and
gave up considerable amounts of his free time in order to cultivate his skill. As a result of his
efforts, he became a skilled carpenter and produced beautiful cabinets that he sold on the market.
Adam consistently made the choices necessary for him to cultivate a profitable skillset.
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However, while Adam chose to do these things with his hands, the fact that Adam had hands in
the first place is a matter of brute luck. If Adam was not born with hands or if he was born with a
hand deformity, he could not have cultivated his excellent carpentry skill, no matter how hard he
tried. Similarly, the fact that Hephaestus was born with a limp foot was a matter of luck, but that
he still made all of the efforts to live a good life was up to him. The point is that even though
people make authentic choices, the choices that they make are dependent on the circumstances
that they come into, and these circumstances are outside of their control.39 This is not to say that
choice is reducible to brute luck; it just to point out that the options available to choose from are
different because of luck. So, the results of labor are the result of both choice and luck.
While it is possible to distinguish between luck and choice, it is impossible to parse the
results of luck from the economic choices that we make. I am not arguing that because there is an
element of luck in determining the choices that are available to us, that therefore we are not
responsible for them. As Arneson rightly points out in response to Hurley, the luck egalitarian
need not be committed to the so-called regression requirement for responsibility.40 As stated
earlier, I am assuming that it is perfectly possible for the luck egalitarian to construe a notion of
choice such that we can say that one is responsible for bringing about her income. Indeed, as I
have told the story, both Adam’s and Hephaestus’s choices played an integral and primary causal
role in the resulting income. As I have stipulated, Adam is economically responsible for
producing his 100 units and Hephaestus is economically responsible for producing his 20 units.
However, luck framed the very choices that they had in the first place. Therefore, it is impossible
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for us to determine how much of Adam’s income was the result of luck and how much the result
of choice, because both choice and luck were necessary and neither alone was sufficient. Since it
is impossible to distinguish how much of one’s income is the result of luck and how much is the
result of choice, the luck egalitarians attempt to find a natural limit based on this separation
strategy is bound to fail.
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4
4.1

CONCLUSIONS

What Went Wrong?
The upshot of this analysis is that while the luck egalitarian standard succeeds in

mitigating the effects of bad luck that specifically flow from initial endowments, it fails to
preserve the choice-sensitive aspects of the baseline condition, and worse than that, it indexes a
person’s economic well-being to two external features. I explore the cause for each of these
failures in turn.
Luck egalitarianism’s failure to preserve the choice-sensitive aspects of the baseline
condition stems from its insistence on a comparative standard. When comparing two individuals
under the luck egalitarian standard, their income is aggregated and equalized whenever their
choice sets are sufficiently similar. Such a standard fails to take into account the unique causal
relationship a person has to their income. In other words, the luck egalitarian standard does not
care about the causal history of someone’s production, it only cares about the relative levels
between individuals who make similar choices. But by failing to address a person’s causal
history, it considers a person only in light of how they compare to others and not on their own
terms, as agents in the world who have made plans for particular reasons, have sacrificed time
and exerted effort for particular purposes, and who monitor their labor-leisure levels in
accordance with their own preferences. Choice-preservation from the baseline is important so
that people not only reap the benefits of their choices but also so that they can properly execute
their plans. By failing to preserve income flowing from choice the luck egalitarian standard runs
roughshod over the choices that people have made and the reasons that they have made those
choices.
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In addition to preserving income flowing from choice, luck egalitarianism intended to
share the burdens of bad luck and it succeeds in mitigating the effects of bad luck that flow from
initial endowments. However, it achieves this goal by exposing individuals to two other strands
of luck stemming from 1) the responsibility of others and 2) the population size. No given
individual has control over how others act, and she has a negligible effect on the total population
size. However, under a luck egalitarian standard, these two factors determine whether a person
gets to keep the lion’s share of what they produce or if they give most of it up. The problem yet
again lies with the comparative nature of the luck egalitarian standard. Since a person’s
entitlements depend on comparisons between their position and responsibility relative to others,
the lives of others will be significant factors in determining their entitlement. So while the bad
effects of unlucky initial endowments will be reduced, this comes at cost of letting two other
luck-based features be chief factors in determining entitlements.

4.2

Reconciling Two Extremes
The idea that choice and not luck should determine the success of a person’s life is a

powerful idea and one that should not be abandoned despite luck egalitarianism’s failure to
achieve it. Indeed, the notion that the success of one’s life should primarily depend on one’s own
choices deeply resonates with common moral sentiment and is arguably the wellspring of
liberalism. The challenge then is this: How should society balance two competing moral
considerations, that individuals are the responsible authors of their own lives entitled to income
flowing from their own choices, and that individuals whose lives are negatively affected by bad
luck are entitled to robust social support?
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With the luck egalitarian position evacuated, there is no prominent theory of distributive
justice which properly accommodates both of these considerations. This is because the tension
inherent in the luck egalitarian position reflects the larger tension within liberalism. Luck
egalitarianism rests on the fault line which divides liberalism into its egalitarian and libertarian
tendencies. The libertarian position could safeguard us from the critique at hand, since under it,
Adam’s life is not subject to any redistributive processes, but it does this at the expense of
making the life of Hephaestus unduly subject to luck. By letting people’s lives succumb to
extraneous circumstances beyond their control, the libertarian position fails to embody the ideal
that the success of a person’s life should flow from the choices she makes. Alternatively, the luck
egalitarian position improves the position of Hephaestus whose life would otherwise be ruined
by bad initial endowments, but it does so at the expense of making the success of Adam’s life
wholly dependent on the choices and circumstances of others. The problem with distributive
egalitarianism is that it considers a person’s life only in a comparative way, by assessing it in
light of others’ lives. A system which completely ties an individual’s welfare to the welfare of
others threatens the notion that the success of our lives is up to us, since it makes the success of
one person’s life depend on the lives of others. For those unsatisfied by either political extremity,
a theory of justice which can reconcile these two competing considerations is needed.
On the one hand, a theory of justice should consider a person’s life on its own, with
independent moral standing, irrespective of how others are doing. On the other hand, a theory of
justice would prevent individuals from becoming victims of their circumstance.41 A system of
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Ideally, we morally want to prevent anyone from falling, period, regardless of whose fault it is. But that is an
attitude that we should have towards others and what we should consider freely doing for them. What we are
considering here is a political regime where we coercively demand income from some and give it to others on the
basis of justice. It is one thing to cultivate empathetic attitudes towards others on a human basis, it is another thing to
coercively demand that all members of a political community satisfy that empathetic attitude. Distributive justice, as
a political aim, involves considering what we can ask from others from the standpoint of justice, not from the
standpoint of considerations of human compassion. The assumption here is that it can be legitimate to redistribute
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distributive justice should mitigate the effects of bad luck but in such a way that limits the
burdens that can be placed upon others. The problem with luck egalitarianism was not in its
original vision, but in the machinery it used to achieve that vision. Both of its failures stemmed
from using a comparative standard to determine entitlements. Instead of using a comparative
standard, those motivated by luck egalitarian ideals could appeal to different kinds of normative
machinery. For example, we could hold that individuals have a pro-tanto entitlement claim to the
product of their labor while simultaneously holding that individuals also have a pro-tanto
compensatory claim when bad luck strikes. The pro-tanto entitlement claim could operate by
setting a threshold or limit on how much can be taken of each dollar earned. Also, going past
certain thresholds would require ever increasing levels of justification, possibly up to the point of
some absolute limit. In the other direction, a pro-tanto compensatory claim could work to
compensate luck not on some comparative basis, but on the existence of some objective
threshold. This could include the use of sufficientarian standards, or some other baseline against
which bad luck is assessed against in order to determine compensatory claims. Much conceptual
work would need to be done in order to determine how exactly this would go, but these
suggestions indicate the possibility of legitimate alternatives for handling both kinds of
normative claims without resorting to comparative measures.
In closing, the problem with the luck egalitarian approach is that luck and its effects
cannot be conceived as a fixed amount which we then go about reapportioning. The very attempt
to correctly reapportion luck paradoxically introduces another kind of luck into the system.
However, this does not necessarily make futile any effort to reduce luck. Redistributing based on
luck is like standing on a balance board; shift your weight too far in any given direction and you

wealth when the person receiving the redistribution is not at fault and that the legitimacy of redistribution comes into
question when the person is at fault for their predicament.

42

fall off, that is, you make some person’s life completely subject to luck. The effort to realize a
system that enables people to flourish based on their own choices should not involve comparing
one life with another, but should instead seek to balance property-based entitlement claims with
luck-based compensatory claims. In short, it is not a question of how to equalize, it is a question
of how to balance.
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